

<p>31/</p> <p>PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED</p>		<p>GROUP 1</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC</p> <p>DOWNGRADING AND</p> <p>DECLASSIFICATION</p>		<p>R1</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> COPY</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> D1</p>
		<p>REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED</p>		
<p>FROM</p> <p>Non CIA</p> <p>AMEMBASSY KARACHI</p>	<p>ADVANCE COPY</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TUBED</p>	<p>UNIT</p> <p>SPO</p>	<p>TIME</p> <p>1700</p>	<p>BY</p> <p>ECU</p>
<p>ACTION</p> <p>No CIA ACTION</p>				
<p>INFO</p> <p>RE. FILE, RE ONE, OCT/17, OCT/18/17, NEZ, [REDACTED] CAZ, [REDACTED] AC, [REDACTED]</p>				

25X1A

O RUEPIA

DE RUEHCR 931 02/1501Z

O 021337Z ZEA

07000

25X1A

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

RUEKDA/DOD

RUEPIA/CIA

O 011935Z ZEA ZFG

FM AMEMBASSY KARACHI

Example of Emt including military in address line

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2097

INFO RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 753

RUFHDK/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 662

RUCJNK/CINCPACAFSA IMMEDIATE UNN

RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE UNN

STATE GRNC

BT

SECRET MAY 2

CINCPACAFSA FOR POLAD

RANN OF KUTCH

SECRET

State Dept. review completed

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FOLLOWING IS ROUND-UP OF MAY 1 DEVELOPMENTS HERE ON RANN OF KUTCH SITUATION:

1. OF PRINCIPAL SIGNIFICANCE WAS FOREIGN MINISTER BHUTTO'S STATEMENT TO ME THAT GOP HAS DEFINITELY DECIDED TO OBSERVE A DE FACTO CEASE FIRE, ASSUMING INDIA DOES THE SAME. I SAW BHUTTO BRIEFLY TONIGHT (MAY 1) JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR PARIS AND LONDON, AND SHORTLY AFTER HE HAD ARRIVED KARACHI FROM RAWALPINDI WHERE TOP LEVEL MEETING PAK OFFICIALS HELD THIS MORNING, APPARENTLY IN THIS QUESTION. BHUTTO MADE IT EVIDENT GOP ACTION WAS IN RESPONSE TO MY APPROACH APRIL 30 ON USE OF MAP EQUIPMENT, CFW 2097 753 662 1 1 890 1 30 MAP

PAGE TWO RUSBKP 62 S E C R E T

STATING PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION IN GOP DECISION WAS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. TO BUTTRESS THIS POINT, I NOTED THAT AS LONG AS CEASE FIRE IN EFFECT, MAP UTILIZATION ISSUE WAS ACADEMIC. BHUTTO POINTED OUT INDIANS HAD BLUNDERED BADLY (HE CALLED IT "A CLASSICAL AMALGAM OF ERRORS") AS TO PLACE, TIMING, DIPLOMACY, AND MILITARY TACTICS, IN OPENING HOSTILITIES IN DISADVANTAGEOUS RANN OF KUTCH AREA, BUT PAKS HAD REFRAINED FROM FULL EXPLOITATION THEIR ADVANTAGE, LARGELY IN DEFERENCE TO U.S AND UK CONCERN. BHUTTO SAID PAKS SEEKING EXPEDITIOUS SETTLEMENT OF ISSUE AND HOPED WE AND UK WOULD HELP PAKISTAN IN ACHIEVING FAVORABLE NEGOTIATING ATMOSPHERE AT PROPER TIME, BEARING IN MIND PAKISTAN'S FORBEARANCE IN NOT PRESSING HER MILITARY ADVANTAGE AT THIS JUNCTURE.

2. DURING DISCUSSION WITH BHUTTO THIS EVENING, IT BECAME CLEAR BHUTTO EXPECTS TO REVIEW WITH SECRETARY AT LONDON ISSUE RAISED WITH ME APRIL 30 (RAWALPINDI'S 42 ANDR43) ON STATUS OF OUR ASSISTANCE PLEDGED TO PAKISTAN IN EVENT INDIANS IMPLEMENT THREATS TO CARRY OUT RETALIATORY ATTACKS IN

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PAK REPRESENTATIONS WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO SECRETARY IN LONDON,  
AND I THOUGHT SECRETARY WOULD BE PREPARED TO SAY SOMETHING ON  
IT IF BHUTTO WISHED TO RAISE MATTER DURING PRIVATE CALL.

CFN MAP 2 42 43 30

PAGE THREE RUSEKP 62 S E C R E T

3. WE DISCUSSED WITH PAK MILITARY AND BHUTTO REQUEST TO SEND  
MAAG OBSERVERS DOWN TO RANN OF KUTCH AREAHO INSPECT USE OF  
MAP EQUIPMENT (DEPTEL 1243). GENERAL RUHLEN WAS INFORMED IN  
RAWALPINDI BY SECOR PAK MILITARY, WHO SEEMED AT FIRST QUITE  
FAVORABLY INCLINED, THAT THIS NOW "QUESTION FOR GOVERNMENT"  
AND OUTSIDE PROVINCE OF PAK MILITARY. I RAISED PROBLEM THIS  
EVENING WITH BHUTTO, WHO FELT VISIT WOULD NOT SERVE USEFUL  
PURPOSE SINCE DE FACTO CEASE FIRE ALREADY IN EFFECT. HE FEARED  
VISIT BY MAAG OFFICERS TO AREA WOULD BE PUBLICIZED DRAMATIZING  
PROBLEM, AND RAISING SPECULATION AND UNHELPFUL QUESTIONS  
AT VERY TIME IT IMPORTANT LET DUST SETTLE. WE SURMISE PRESS  
LEAKS FROM DELHI OF LIKELIHOOD OF U.S. INSPECTION PAK USE OF  
MAP EQUIPMENT, ABOUT WHICH PAK PRESS HAVE QUERIED US,  
HAVE PUT GOP BACKS UP. I DID NOT PRESS ISSUE WITH BHUTTO  
FURTHER AT THIS TIME IN VIEW PRESENT DE FACTO CEASE FIREUND  
FULL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GOP THAT 51ST BRIGADE IN RANN IS  
PARTLY MAP SUPPORTED, AND THAT SOME MAP EQUIPMENT INEVITABLY USED.

4. I ALSO MET WITH UK HICOM JAMES LATE TODAY AND HE GAVE ME

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**SECRET**

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COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT AND ANALYSIS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS IN DELHI

AND HIS SCENARIO FOR NEXT STEPS. JAMES SAID INDIAN CABINET HAD AGREED THAT INDIAN FORCES WOULD NOT INITIATE ACTION IN RANN IF PAKS ACCEPTED SAME SELF-LIMITATION. JAMES NOTED THAT AYUB CFN 3 MAP 1243 .-0 &90 &90 51ST MAP MAP 4

RGE FOUR RUSBKP 62 S E C R E T

HAD SAID IN HIS SECOND LETTER TO WILSON THAT PAK FORCES IN RANN AREA HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO DO ANYTHING TO AGGRAVATE PRESENT SITUATION. WILSON HAD NAILED DOWN THIS DE FACTO CEASE FIRE, OR "LULL" AS JAMES CALLED IT, BY FURTHER LETTERS TO AYUB AND SHASTRI NOTING THAT IN PRACTICE THERE WAS NO FIRING IN RANN AND STATING UK ASSUMPTION THAT THERE WOULD BE NO TACTICAL MOVEMENTS IN AREA WHILE CEASE FIRE BEING NEGOTIATED.

5. ON CEASE FIRE, JAMES SAID INDIAN PROBLEM WITH SECOND WILSON PROPOSAL WAS FEAR THAT UNCONDITIONAL CEASE FIRE WOULD LEAD TO DE FACTO BORDER ON BASIS PRESENT MILITARY POSITION IN RANN WHICH IS FAVORABLE TO PAKS.

6. ON WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, INDIANS WERE NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN FORCES OF BOTH SIDES FROM DISPUTED AREA AS SOUGHT BY PAKS AND CONTINUED INSIST ON REVERSION TO STATUS QUO AS OF JANUARY 1, 1965. JAMES NOTED PAKS WERE PREPARED MOVE FORCES FROM KANJARKOT AS PART OF DEAL INVOLVING COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL BOTH FORCES FROM DISPUTED AREA

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BT INDIANS DID NOT TAKE THIS UP. (SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN DELHI'S

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624 THERE APPARENTLY SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OF JAMES STATEMENT

CFN 5 6 1 1965 624

PAGE FIVE RUSBKP 62 S E C R E T

RE PAK POSITION ON CONDITION FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM KANJARKOT.)

JAMES WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR REDUCING SIGNIFICANT GAP BETWEEN INDIAN AND PAK POSITIONS ON QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES.

7. ON PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINATION OF BORDER (THIRD STAGE), JAMES SAID HE MADE POINT WITH INDIANS THAT PAKS FEARED THAT MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE AVERTED BY INDIANS OCE CEASE FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES HAD TAKEN PLACE AND THAT INDIANS NEEDED TO GIVE PAKS MORE ASSURANCE ON THIS POINT.

8. JAMES FELT THAT HE MADE SOME PROGRESS TOWARD GETTING INDIANS TO ADMIT EXISTENCE OF DISPUTED AREA. HE HOPED FORMULA WOULD BE FOUND FOR HANDLING THIS.

9. JAMES HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO PROCEED WITH FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH PAKS AND TO PRESENT FORMULA FOR BRIDGING GAP BETWEEN PAKS AND INDIANS ON WHETHER "DISPUTE" ON RANN OF KUTCH EXISTS.

HE HAS APPOINTMENT WITH AYUB IN RAWALPINDI AT 1730 HOURS MAY

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2 (TOMORROW) Approved For Release 2002/01/24 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000600030008-0

CONCERNED THAT SUFFICIENT GOODWILL AND FLEXIBILITY  
MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE ONEITHER SIDE TO NEGOTIATE OUT FOR-  
MIDABLE INDO-PAK DIFFERENCES ON STAGE TWO WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES  
IN LIMITED TIME THAT WE MAY HAVE. MISGIVINGS ON THIS SCORE ARE  
AMPLE WARRANTED.

GP-3.

MCCONAUGHY

BT

**SECRET**